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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Countries of central and eastern Europe find themselves in a position of making important 
choices about design and organization of their civil service. In many cases public administration 
reform was delayed, because it was judged to be of lesser urgency than the creation of a market 
economy. It is, however, increasingly recognized that an effective and professional civil service is 
an important precondition for a sustainable market economy as well as for socio-economic 
development in general, and the opinion is gaining ground that civil service and market economy 
should co-evolve.  
 
Redesigning public administration has been a challenging task. The high degree of politicization 
under the Soviet regime had placed civil service in an entirely subservient position relative to 
political forces. Given these initial conditions, the transformation of civil servants into creative 
policy makers and professional policy implementers does not come easily, and it is not yet 
completed. This means that the way in which civil service will organize itself remains an open 
issue in many countries. This suggests that if trends for the future are to be detected, they may be 
best obtained through conversations with civil servants and politicians. 
 
The interviews, which form the basis of this study, were conducted in 2001/2002. At that time, 
the aspiring EU member candidate countries were in hyper-drive to satisfy the requirements for 
the EU entry – including requirements for public administration. After the countries became EU 
members in 2004, an apparent reform fatigue set in – understandable for anyone who witnessed 
the enormous energy output prior to the EU entry. Judging from subsequent research by other 
authors, the key points of our findings remain valid
2
  to this date
3
 - not only for the target 
countries of our paper, but also (and prominently) for the 2007 EU entrants Romania
4
 and 
Bulgaria, as well as the Balkan countries that formed after the break-up of Yugoslavia, and the 
                                                          
2
 See for example: 
For Russia: Nistotskaya (2009) 
For Poland: Tatiana Majcherkiewicz (2006), in particular page 2 & 3. 
For Estonia: Keris, Maria and Jako Salla (2006), in particular page 7. 
For Romania: Ioniţă, Alexandru-Leonard (2006), in particular pages 6,7,8. 
For the former Yugoslav states: Rabrenovic, Aleksandra and Tony Verheijen (2005), in particular pages 2 &3..  
For Post-Communist Europe on the whole: Meyer-Sahling, Jan-Hinrik (2004). 
For Hungary: Meyer-Sahling, Jan-Hinrik (2006). 
 
3
 See UNDP/RCPAR (2011) midterm evaluation report of an ongoing development project for a demonstration that the 
concerns addressed in this paper have not gone away.       
4
 Consider, for example the following quotes from Ioniţă, Alexandru-Leonard (2006) on the state of public 
administration in Romania: 
 p. 6. “Generally speaking, the problems that were present during communist times did not disappear; some of them 
were not even openly addressed, leaving also political-administrative relations largely unreformed. Positions in the 
upper levels of the civil service continued to be distributed based on party loyalty, a practice known as „political 
clientelism‟ ”. 
p. 6-7 “A related weakness of post communist political-administrative relations has been the exclusion of the civil 
servants from the policy development process. The potential role of civil servants as professional advisors on policy 
matters has been disregarded, as politicians have relied heavily on political advisers from outside the civil service when 
it came to policy development. Although the communist period has appropriate for the new circumstances, the true 
main cause for keeping the civil servants away from policy formulation was political clientelism. Administrators were 
granted positions of influence on the basis of their likely future use to a party or interest group powerful enough to 
maintain them, regardless of their managerial skills or other professional qualifications.” 
p. 7 “A general problem affecting the reform of political-administrative relations throughout the CEE is that of trust. 
Are new governments willing to work with the same civil service that they find in place once they gain power, or do 
they feel threatened by it, as they perceive it a Trojan horse of the former government that will systematically 
undermine their governance?”  
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Central and East European countries outside the EU. As a consequence little has changed in the 
public administration landscape since the time of the interviews – preserving the relevance of the 
findings to this date. In addition EU entry prompted an exodus of many of the countries‟ most 
experienced civil servants toward Brussels to fill commission and committee posts as 
representatives of their countries at the EU table – leaving behind an gap not so easily filled in 
some of the smaller countries.  
 
In this contribution I am reporting on the findings collected during 56 conversations with civil 
servants and politicians in Estonia, Lithuania, Czech Republic and Poland. In particular I am 
reporting on the following important classes of relations:  
 
Internal Relations 
  Employment Relations/Internal Labor Market 
 Evaluation of performance and outcomes 
  Centralized versus decentralized decision making 
  Rules versus discretion 
  
External Relations 
 Relations between the public sector and the private sector 
 Relations between civil servants and politicians 
 
One interesting finding is the relatively small variation in response profiles across the researched 
countries. This suggests that, starting from common initial conditions of extremely centralized 
decision making, as well as political dominance over public administration, countries are 
pursuing similar goals along similar trajectories. A strong equalizing force has been the countries‟ 
intensive preparation for joining the European Union (EU) -  which they did on May 1,  2004. By 
imposing a common set of qualification criteria, including criteria for public administration 
capacity, the European Commission has focused the reform efforts of East European countries on 
a common, narrowly defined set of goals and objectives. Seen in this light, the similarity in 
response profiles to the interview questions should not come as a surprise. As a consequence, this 
contribution is centered on features that are common to the research target countries, with only 
occasional remarks directed at their differences. 
 
 
II. INTERVIEW METHODOLOGY     
 
During 2001/2002 fifty-six conversations took place, each conversation lasting between one and 
two hours. The protocol called for a standardized structured interview (each interviewee was 
presented the same list of questions), and a subsequent unstructured conversation.  
 
61% of interviewees agreed to a meeting upon first contact. The remaining 39% agreed to be 
interviewed after several iterations of follow-up mail and telephone calls. This mix of people with 
initial high, and initial low enthusiasm mitigates possible self-selection bias. 
 
The final selection of interviewees was taken from four groupings of the ministerial hierarchy in 
the following proportions: 
 
 Vice-Minister, Secretary of State, Secretary General, Deputy Secretary General, and Director   
   General: 28%  
 Directors of departments:  42% 
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 Heads of subdivisions of departments: 15% 
 Officials, Analysts, and Advisors of Civil Service Offices and other supra-ministerial units    
   directing and monitoring civil service reform:  15%. 
 
In accordance with the orientation of the research project the majority of interviewees, 85% were 
civil servants
5
. The remaining 15% were political people. The definition of civil service positions 
and political positions follows the respective civil service legislation. 
 
While incumbents of political posts are subject to replacement after a formation of a new 
government
6
, incumbents of civil service post are not to be replaced as a consequence of a change 
in government, in order to provide continuity of the state
7
. This is in accordance with the 
respective countries‟ civil service legislation. However, it was reported that in practice civil 
servants often are replaced after changes in government. 
 
Politicians are included in the interviews because, although civil service legislation makes clear 
distinctions between political posts and civil service posts, in practice this line is blurred. 
Furthermore, a number of interesting developments are evolving at the dividing line between civil 
service and politicians. It also is of interest to learn how politicians perceive civil service, and 
compare it to civil servants‟ own perception. 
 
The following institutions were visited: 
 
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
  Ministry of Agriculture 
  Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs 
  Ministry of Environment 
  Ministry of Economy 
  Ministry of Culture 
  Office of Public Administration/Office of Civil Service/European Committee 
 
To preserve confidentiality of sources this report avoids any links between statements and the 
individuals issuing or supporting the statements. Tape recorders were not used, in accordance 
with the interview protocol. The interview protocol was distributed to interviewees well in 
advance. 
 
                                                          
5
 In this paper we define a civil servant to be a civilian career public sector employee working in a department of 
government. This category always includes such public employees at the level of national government, and may, 
depending on the country, also include those working at the regional or municipal level of government. By ‘civil 
service’ we then mean a certain branch of governmental service, whose employees are hired and promoted on the basis 
of merit, and who are expected to deal with the public according to a code of ethics which includes impartially, 
transparency, accountability and professionalism. By comparison we define public administration more broadly as the 
design, implementation and management of government policy or branches of government policy. Public 
administration is meant to pursue the public good by bringing about and guarding social justice and by enhancing civil 
society.  
 
6
 However, a number of instances were reported, where political people stayed on after a change in government. 
7
 For example the “classical model” of public administration calls for a civil service, which is professional, 
independent of political parties, and responsible for the implementation of state policy. Whereas governments may 
change frequently, career civil servants remain, accumulate experience and skills, and guarantee continuity of the state. 
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The texts of respective countries‟ civil service laws served as an additional, and corroborating, 
source of information. With the exception of Czech Republic, the visited countries had, at the 
time of the interviews, enacted comprehensive civil service laws.  
 
 
 
III  INTERVIEW RESULTS 
 
1. INTERNAL RELATIONS 
 
A large part of public administration reform concerns relations, and modes of operation, inside 
individual institutions. It includes issues such as policies and practices of hiring and firing 
employees, career development opportunities, and other personnel policies. Furthermore, the 
degree of centralization or decentralization of decision-making, as well as rules versus discretion, 
belong to this category. Employee motivation, incentives, and quality control are further 
important concerns of internal relations. This is by no means an exhaustive list of internal 
relations themes, rather, it is determined by the scope of this project.  
 
1.1 Employment Relations/Internal Labor Market 
 
Definitions of clear human resource strategies are in an early development stage. Recruiting is, on 
average, conducted relatively passively, and often lacks pro-active initiatives to attract talented 
candidates. 
 
There is a lack of mechanisms for allocating staff to areas with the greatest needs. This leads to 
observed mismatches. Some departments are overstaffed, while some are understaffed. All-too-
often it is the understaffed departments that are charged with the most urgent tasks. 
 
While civil service legislation provides the necessary legal framework for civil service reform, it 
is the organization, strategy, quality of personnel and leadership that drive the reform. Therefore, 
recruiting, retaining and developing good staff is of great importance. 
 
 
 
 
1.1.1 Finding Qualified Staff 
 
The majority of interviewees reported a shortage of qualified applicants for civil service 
positions. 69% of all interviewees
8
 had repeatedly experienced serious difficulties in finding 
qualified staff. Vacant positions were reported to persist over significant periods of time. There 
was little variation between countries. There was, however, substantial variation between 
different types of ministries across the target countries. Of the 31% of interviewees, who reported 
no problems in recruiting staff, representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs formed the 
majority. Applicants are attracted to this ministry through a combination of factors, such as 
opportunity of foreign assignments, the status that this ministry enjoys, and the successful 
cultivation of a certain esprit de corps.  
  
                                                          
8
 When the term “x% of interviewees” is used, it means that all interviewees responded, i.e. # of 
interviewees = # of respondents = 56.  
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Representatives of the Ministry of Culture accounted for the second group of respondents 
that reported to have no problems in recruiting staff. Here the explanation lies in the severe 
scarcity of private sector employment opportunities for arts graduates, which drives large 
numbers of applicants toward every job opening at the Ministry of Culture.  
 
 Overall one of the most serious difficulties was reported to be the recruiting of lawyers, 
stemming from the salary differential between private and public sector lawyer positions. In the 
Czech Republic this shortage, reportedly, at times has been so severe that the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs “rents out” its lawyers to other ministries. 
 
 
1.1.2 Personnel Departments        
 
Personnel departments were, on average, reported to be weak, inadequately staffed, under-
utilized, and the object of complaints. This is unfortunate, given the difficulty in recruiting 
qualified staff.  
 
Particularly in Poland and Lithuania the personnel departments were reported to do only 
what is required by law.  This typically means that they are not vigorously competing for talent in 
the job market. Furthermore, once employees are hired, they typically receive little assistance 
from the personnel department in matters of career development.  
 
 If personnel departments are to engage in setting incentives to attract and retain capable 
personnel, they need to know what motivates people to enter public administration, and what 
motivates them to stay 
 
 
 
 
1.1.3 What Motivates People to Enter the Public Administration Profession? 
 
70% of interviewees reported the opportunity for educational programs, and interesting contacts 
to be the main motivator for people to enter into public administration. This also points to a 
potential problem: high turnover rate at entry level positions. Many newcomers consider an entry 
level public administration position to be a good jumping board for subsequent application to 
private sector positions, which, on average, offer higher salaries. 
 
14% of interviewees thought that the challenge of working on interesting and important matters 
was the key attractor for people to enter the profession. Many respondents reported a noticeable 
shift over the past decade. The challenge of “doing something for one‟s country” was an 
important motivator in the early years after political independence of the target countries. In the 
meantime more pragmatic personal reasons motivate job applicants.  
 
9% of respondents listed the prospect of involvement in policy design as the principal attractor of 
their employees – emphasizing the creative element.  
 
3% listed the status that a public administration position carries as the biggest attractor, and 3% 
listed job security as the principal motivator.  
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Reasons for Joining Civil Service
Opportunity
71%
Challenge
14%
Policy design
9%
Job status
3%
Job security
3%
 
 
1.1.4 What Motivates People to Stay in the Public Administration Profession? 
 
Long-term career prospect was listed as the main motivator by 80% of respondents. This points 
to an important, but currently unfulfilled role to be played by personnel departments. Designing 
alternative career paths and providing career counseling would go a long way to meet career 
expectations of employees, while at the same time increasing stability and administrative capacity 
of the public institution, and reducing the reported high personnel turnover.  
7% of respondents reported that job security was the main motivator, 5% named 
challenge, 4% status and 4% policy design as principal factors to motivate people to stay in 
public   administration.                                                          
 Reasons to stay in Civil Service
Long term career
80%
Security
7%
Challenge
5%
Status
4%
Policy design
4%
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1.2 Evaluation of Performance and Outcomes 
 
Evaluation mechanisms are in their infancy, both with regard to evaluation of outcomes and 
evaluation of individual employee performance. 
 
On the employee evaluation side a comprehensive performance management system is still 
lacking in most cases. In conjunction with weak accountability systems this means that quality of 
results and performance are only weakly linked with remuneration. As a consequence motivation 
systems are non-transparent and highly discretionary. Furthermore, a dependence between 
evaluation, remuneration and budget, in most cases, is completely lacking. 
 
Among the target countries of this research Estonia appears to have gone the furthest in matters of 
evaluation of performance and outcomes. A set of evaluation criteria and indicators have been 
developed. But statistics are, often, collected without being processed. So they have little effect 
on subsequent decisions. 
  
To get an impression of the weights that are placed on different classes of indicators, interviewees 
were asked to rank the following criteria according to their importance:  
 
- on-time performance 
- true-to-plan implementation (rather than “watered down”) 
- cost-effectiveness 
- widely accepted (policy approval) 
- percent of target group reached  
 
80% of interviewees responded to this question and gave a ranking. Of this group of respondents  
53% stated that the most important criterion was that a policy was widely accepted. 25% stated 
that an implementation that was true-to-plan was the most important thing. 13% considered that 
reaching the largest possible number of people in the relevant target group was number one 
concern, and 9% listed cost effectiveness as the highest priority. None of the respondents listed 
“on-time” as the highest 
priority.
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Evaluation Criteria for Judging Outcomes
Widely accepted
53%
True to plan
25%
Percent of target group
13%
Cost effectiveness
9%
On time
0%
 
 
 
1.3 Centralization versus Decentralization of Decision-Making 
 
Given the initial condition of extreme centralization of public administration under the Soviet 
System, the post-soviet trend clearly has been toward decentralization.  
 
Interviewees were asked whether they considered decision-making at their institution to be 
centralized or decentralized. 91% of interviewees responded to this question. Of this group of 
respondents 20% thought that decision-making was centralized, while 80% described it as 
decentralized.  
 
The high response rate describing the conditions as “decentralized” has to be kept in perspective. 
It is to be expected that many respondents use the extreme centralization of administrative 
relations of the past as a reference point. Against such an extreme point of reference the tendency 
to overstate the current situation as “decentralized” should not be ignored. 
 
When asked, whether decision-making was too centralized, too decentralized, or just right, 
responses were as follows: 19% of respondents considered it to be too centralized, 2% considered 
it to be too decentralized, while the majority, 79%, considered it to be just right. (Reference group 
for this question: 52 respondents; 93% of interviewees). Several comments are in order: Among 
the group, who considered the degree of decentralization “just right” was a sub-group, which 
qualified the response in an interesting way. They considered the situation “just right for the 
moment, given the capacity limitations of lower-tier staff “. According to their description, 
delegation of decision authority to lower levels had come to a halt, necessitated by the lack of 
staff with the requisite qualifications. But in the absence of this binding constraint, further 
decentralization was considered desirable. Particularly in Poland and Lithuania a number of 
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senior officials, as well as department heads, reported aggravation about work overload that 
should (but at the moment could not) be delegated to lower level staff. 
 
1.4 Rules versus Discretion 
 
It is difficult to disagree with the view that there should be rules as well as room for discretion. 
There is, however, perennial disagreement on the “right” proportions of rules versus discretion.  
While rules, at the minimum, set the legal framework for the policy environment, discretion is 
credited with providing necessary variation for different human and social situations, as well as 
providing creative space. 
 
There was wide agreement, expressed by 91% of respondents, that there is sufficient room for 
creativity. (Reference group: 55 respondents; 98% of interviewees). Furthermore, 97% of 
interviewees reported that they did not feel too restricted by rules, leaving only 3%, who had 
experienced rules to be too restrictive. 
 
It is, however, interesting to note that 41% of interviewees expressed a desire for more rules, 
while 59% did not want more rules. Among the reasons behind a desire for more rules are the 
perception of too much discretion given to people with insufficient competence and experience. 
In the eyes of respondents there is a direct link between too much discretion given to 
inexperienced officials and erratic policies, aborted policies and other indicators of an immature 
policy-making and implementing process.  Another reported reason for wanting more rules is the 
perceived inefficiency of having to  “re-invent the wheel” again and again, in matters that should 
be treated as routine. Furthermore, inconsistency in the treatment of similar cases was identified 
as a major reason for customer dissatisfaction with public sector services, leading to alienation of 
citizen from the public sector in general. 
 
 By “more rules” respondents typically meant a more systematic way of formulating policy goals 
and the means to achieve them, and more cooperation on identifying best practices. Tools and 
processes for systematic knowledge sharing and transfer of best practices are typically absent or 
in the early stage of development. This is a serious obstacle to organizational learning. 
 
 
 
2. External Relations 
 
2.1 Public Sector – Private Sector Relations 
 
What tasks in a society should be performed by the public sector, and what tasks by the private 
sector? Different countries at different times have attempted to answer this question based on 
ideology, on practicality, according to egalitarian principles or on grounds of efficiency, to name 
only a few of the criteria.  
 
In Central and Eastern Europe, starting from an initial condition of unchallenged state ownership 
and control of virtually all societal, economic and political processes, the trend has been 
decidedly toward reducing the influence of the state, and increasing the role of the private sector. 
But where should this process stop? Which tasks should remain in the hands of the public sector? 
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And how much communication and feedback should there be between policy makers and those 
who are affected by the policy?  
 
2.1.1 Outsourcing 
 
Outsourcing, in our context, is a practice of delegating previously publicly provided services to 
the private sector, with the overall responsibility and oversight remaining with the public agency. 
Outsourcing has been embraced by the public sector on grounds of efficiency gains.  
        
84% of interviewees reported that their institution has been engaged in outsourcing, while 16% 
reported not knowing of any outsourcing activities at their institution. In particular representatives 
of the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Culture reported successful outsourcing 
experiences, with what can be called essential services. In many instances this represents handing 
over service provision and management to the local level, in collaboration with non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). 
 
As to be expected, representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which are principally 
engaged in “sovereign transactions”, reported very limited incidence of outsourcing, or none at 
all. If outsourcing occurs it is reportedly limited to public relations campaigns, web-site 
construction and management, as well as educational services. 
 
When asked whether at their institution there was too much outsourcing going on, 21% of 
interviewees reported “yes”, and 79% reported “no”. When asked whether their institution should 
do more outsourcing, relative to the current level, 16% answered in the affirmative, while 84% 
responded with “no”. So, the majority of respondents expressed satisfaction with the level of 
outsourcing occurring at their institution. 
 
A similar pattern of responses is observed, when interviewees were asked, whether in general, in 
their country, more tasks should be transferred from the public sector to the private sector. 14% of 
respondents voiced the opinion that more tasks should be shifted to the private sector, while 75% 
said there should be no more transfers to the private sector, and 11% were unsure. 
 
The interesting thing is what lies behind the differentiated responses.  
 
 
2.1.2 Outsourcing and Efficiency? 
 
The most frequently heard argument in favor of transferring tasks to the private sector is 
efficiency. Some schools of thought in public administration, in particular “New Public 
Management” consider private management to be categorically superior to public management. 
The main reason for their judgment is the perceived higher efficiency of private management 
relative to public management. The focus of these schools of thought on the issue of efficiency is 
so strong that it sometimes has led to mistaking efficiency for a goal, rather than recognizing it as 
an attribute of the means for reaching a goal. 
 
When asked whether there are efficiency gains from outsourcing to the private sector only 27% of 
interviewees responded with “yes”, while a surprising 73% responded with “no”. After probing 
for the reasons behind the answers the following picture emerges. 
 
The majority of the 73%, who responded that there were no efficiency gains from outsourcing, 
reported that they had come to this opinion relatively recently, and a few years earlier would have 
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voiced a more favorable opinion about efficiency and outsourcing. Reportedly, there were initial 
efficiency gains through outsourcing in the sense of providing services at lower cost. But these 
gains were short-lived. Soon the contracted private service providers ran into budget problems. 
These budget problems were dealt with by either raising the prices they charged for the services, 
or by eliminating a number of services, and often both. This means that in the end fewer services 
were available, many of them at higher prices (relative to the imputed prices of the initially 
publicly provided services). Some respondents went so far as to voice a sense of “betrayal”. A 
high incidence of private companies invoking escape clauses, built into their outsourcing contract, 
is observed -  an event, which had appeared very remote, at the time of the signing of the contract. 
 
Of the 27% who reported efficiency gains from passing on services to the private sector, there 
were representatives from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Ministry of Culture, who, as 
mentioned above, had successful outsourcing experiences to private service providers and NGOs. 
This group also included those, whose institutions had outsourced only non-essential services, 
such as website construction, or preparation of public relations brochures, i.e. tasks, for which 
there was no dedicated in-house expertise. Among the 27% reporting efficiency gains was also a 
group, which operated with a peculiar definition of efficiency, which can be summarized as: 
“Efficient is that which reduces the public institution‟s budget.” This is not the economists‟ 
definition of efficiency. This last point deserves some attention, as there seems to be considerable 
confusion about the meaning of efficiency in the public administration environment.  
 
The following serves as our working definition of economic  efficiency: 
 
We say that practice A is more efficient than practice B if  
 
(i) Practice A provides the same output (qualitative and quantitative) of services as 
practice B, but practice A uses less (or less costly) inputs than practice B 
or 
 
(ii) Practice A provides more output (qualitative and/or quantitative) of services as 
practice B, while using the same amount of (or value of) inputs. 
 
 
Some of the respondents looked only at the input side, saying that private services are more 
efficient because they use less inputs. But they forgot to look at the simultaneous reduction in 
output (services). At the other extreme were some respondents, who looked only at the outputs, 
claiming to observe a reduction in services (outputs) after outsourcing, while neglecting to look at 
the input side, which had also been reduced.      
 
The assessment of efficiency of transferring tasks to the private sector is complicated by a 
number of factors. Outsourcing may reduce public sector budgets. But if quantity and/or quality 
of services are also reduced – how do we evaluate that? Reduction of the public sector budget by 
itself certainly is not a proof of efficiency. 
 
This does not mean that it is bad to evaluate the need for given services. As societies change, so 
changes the mix of desired service. Identifying obsolete and redundant services, as well as 
discovering new needs, should be an ongoing process in any system of public administration. So, 
reduction in services, by itself, also is difficult to judge.  
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The question is whether or not, or to what extent the market is the best forum to decide which 
needs are important and which are not. Important to whom? Different societies have passed 
judgment on this in different ways. 
 
 
2.1.3 Private Sector Participation in the Public Policy Process 
 
Central and east European countries reportedly suffer from a lack of constructive dialogue 
between the public sector and the citizenry. Or, put in a different way, there is little 
communication between policy makers and those who are affected by the policy, before a policy 
is implemented. 72% of interviewees listed the lack of dialog as a serious concern.
9
   
 
There are exceptions, such as some of the Ministries of Agriculture, which may reportedly have 
gone too far in the opposite direction, and may run the risk of being “captured” by special 
interests. Of course the ministry of agriculture, in many countries, is cast into the dual role of 
cheerleader for the industry, while at the same time performing the role of policeman through its 
various regulatory programs. 
 
But in general, there is a reported need for public hearings and comment periods, during which 
segments of the population that will be affected by a proposed policy have the opportunity to 
voice their concerns. In the absence of an early comment period, the population‟s outlet for 
opinion is typically in the form of complaints after the policy is in force. Improvement in the 
quality of policies, and a reduction in implementation problems are expected from such a 
participatory approach. In particular, timely communication is expected to reduce the above 
mentioned incidences of abrupt policy reversals, and aborted policies, thereby promising to lift 
the image of public administration professionalism. Both sides are bound to win. 
 
 
2.2 Relations between civil servants and politicians  
  
The reform of public administration is facing formidable obstacles. Owing to a history of  
political control over civil service people had grown accustomed to seeing civil service in an 
ancillary position relative to political power. (Verheijen 1998, pp.207-219, Hesse 1993, pp.65-
74). This former “feudal” culture of patronage-based relations conditioned people to accept 
loyalty to the patron, rather than professionalism, as the most important attribute of a successful 
civil servant. Turning around this role perception, and transforming civil servants into creative 
policy designers, who take responsibility for their own decisions, is a task that is by no means 
completed. 
 
The urgency of de-politicizing civil service is not only perceived by observers and analysts, but, 
as the interviews show, also by civil servants themselves, as well as by the politicians 
participating in this research project.  100% of interviewees expressed an opinion on this issue. 
The opinion was unanimous: Civil Service career positions should be kept out of the direct 
influence of politicians.  Furthermore, 100% of interviewees reported that civil service and 
politics were at present NOT kept sufficiently separate in their country. (See Nistotskaya 2009 for 
more on this issue for the case of Russia) 
 
                                                          
9
 See for example (UNDP/BRC) (2007) for an assessment of the sorry state of ex-ante policy impact 
assessment in South-Eastern Europe. 
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One of the consequences of high politicization of civil service is an observed high turnover rate in 
senior civil service positions, stemming from frequent changes in the composition of government. 
This high turnover is on collision course with the desire for greater administrative stability and 
stronger administrative capacity. Interviewees expressed strong opinions in these matters.  
98% of interviewees considered it very important to shield civil service from direct political 
interference, 95% of interviewees considered it very important to establish a culture of civil 
service professionalism, and 91% considered it very important to achieve administrative stability. 
 
 
2.2.1 High Turnover of Civil Servants   
 
94% of interviewees reported to have observed civil servants replaced after formation of a new 
government.  The allegedly politically motivated replacements typically occur in the highest civil 
service positions. However, there is significant variation in the affected levels of the ministerial 
hierarchy. Occasionally, politically motivated replacements were reported to include the level of 
department directors
10
.  But, regardless of the point of incidence within the administrative 
hierarchy, the practice of politically motivated replacements of senior officials increases 
personnel turnover. It also tends to drain expertise from the system, as, frequently, more 
experienced people are replaced by less experienced people. Whether politically motivated or not, 
high turnover in civil service presents a serious obstacle to the building of administrative 
capacity.  
 
One might think that politicians like to see civil service under the control of political power. 
However, the politicians interviewed for this research expressed a preference for a civil service 
that is independent of direct political interference.
11
 They were found to value a stable and 
professional civil service, because without it policy implementation does not function well. 
 
There is also a cynical point of view: After politicians of the governing party or coalition have 
filled key civil service positions with people loyal to their cause, of course they are for stability 
and continuity of civil service, so that their people stay in place, even if the opposition wins the 
next elections. 
 
 
2.2.2 Adverse Consequences of Politicization   
 
Politicization of civil service is known to have a number of adverse consequences. First of all it 
hampers the building of high administrative capacity. Given the frequent changes in government, 
civil servants, who only last as long as the current government, simply do not stay in their jobs 
long enough to accumulate experience. 93% of respondents reported the adverse effect of high 
turnover on administrative capacity and professionalism as a very serious situation. 
 
High turnover in civil service positions destroys continuity of the policy-making and policy-
implementing process. 88% of respondents reported incidences of aborted policies or abrupt 
policy reversals. Thereof 69% saw a direct link to personnel changes in key civil service 
positions. 
 
                                                          
10
 For example, this was reported to have happened at the Estonian Ministry of Agriculture. 
11
 We recall that 100% of interviewees expressed the view that civil service and politics should be kept 
separate. This includes politicians, which constituted 15% of all interviewees. 
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The negative impact of policy discontinuities is twofold. First there is the encumbered policy 
process itself, and the danger of serious mistakes. Second the perception of the public deserves 
attention. If policy makers are perceived to be erratic, unpredictable and willful, this will promote 
neither dialogue nor trust. Needless to say, an erratic policy behavior is a serious obstacle to the 
creation of a professional administrative culture. 
 
 
 
2.2.3 Civil Service Legislation   
 
At the time of the interviews, civil service laws were in place (among the target countries of this 
research) in Poland, Lithuania and Estonia, while in the Czech Republic comprehensive civil 
service legislation was still awaiting parliamentary approval. These laws typically explain the 
rights and duties of civil servants. They also draw the line between civil service positions and 
political positions, and usually state that the incumbents of civil service positions should not be 
replaced due to political reasons. 
 
It is not surprising to see a marked difference between what the civil service laws prescribe, and 
what is practiced – the typical implementation problem.  
 
More disturbingly, civil service laws have taken on a “proprietary” character. A particular civil 
service law is “our” civil service law, or “their” civil service law, depending on whether we take 
the perspective of the current government or its political opposition. Particularly in Poland and 
Lithuania, it was reported that an incoming government will want to quickly rid itself of “their” 
law, and put in its place the “own” law. In this way civil service laws are, reportedly, used as 
political tools, to facilitate the placement of party-loyal staff into key positions, whenever there is 
a new edition of civil service law. 
  
This also points to immature political and administrative processes, in particular, a serious 
weakness in current coalition politics. The idea that a parliamentary majority should share 
governance with the parliamentary minority is ill understood. Consequently, the opinions of the 
opposition parties, with regard to appointments to key civil service positions, are typically 
ignored. Opposition parties, resentfully, wait until it is their turn at the government table. Then it 
is their turn to ignore the opinions of the parliamentary minority. 
 
 
IV  POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
The interviews that form the basis for this research clearly reflect a number of high priority policy 
goals, as well as preferences and criteria for the means by which the goals are to be pursued.  
 
First and foremost the need for de-politicization of civil service can hardly be overemphasized. 
The political dominance over civil service, together with significant remnants of the “feudal” 
culture of administrative relations, often referred to as the “patronage system”, form the principal 
retarding element to the building of high administrative capacity. The fallout of politicization 
comes partly in the form of high turnover of senior civil servants. This prevents senior civil 
servants from accumulating the necessary experience to be effective. Moreover, it sets incentives 
to reward the wrong people for the wrong reasons. 
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Interview results clearly reflect an understanding of this issue among civil servants. As a matter 
of fact there was consensus about the high priority of creating a professional civil service, 
independent from political control. 
 
The key policy question is: What mechanism will de-politicize civil service and lead to a 
professional civil service corps?  
 
Two competing schools of thought are vying for attention.  New Public Management
12
(NPM) 
emphasizes “market-like” structures, including remuneration schemes that consist of a base salary 
plus substantial bonuses and commissions, as well as vigorous outsourcing to the private sector. 
The philosophy is that self-interest is a powerful motivator. The energies released by self-
interested behavior are to be harnesses by reward schemes, and bundled into market-like 
competitive structures with high output and high efficiency. 
 
However, applications of this model, have shown a tendency to re-establish political control over 
civil service – exactly the opposite of what 100% of interviewees of this study considered 
desirable for their country.
13
 So, in the important aspect of relations between civil servants and 
politicians, the NPM approach appears to be unsuitable, given the current needs. 
 
Given that 98% of interviewees considered the shielding of civil service from direct political 
interference to be very important, 95% considered it very important to establish a culture of civil 
service professionalism, and 91% of interviewees considered it very important to achieve high 
administrative capacity, this points to the classical model
14
 of public administration as a suitable 
candidate. The so-called classical model of public administration displays the features of self-
management of public administration, clear separation between civil service and politics with 
strict rules of non-interference by politicians in civil service matters, high job security for civil 
servants, and a career system that relies on merit and seniority. 
 
The perceived inefficiencies of the classical system may be a small price to pay, if in return we 
get a professional civil service corps that understands whom it is to serve. 
 
These considerations, together with the interview results reported in the preceding chapters, lead 
to the following principal policy implications.  
 
 Given the current state of civil service and its relation to politics, the market-like incentive 
structures associated with New Public Management appear to be ill advised.  
 Sequencing is important: Only after the steps of de-politicization have been completed, and 
after the vicious circle of patron-client relations has been broken, and a sufficient level of 
transparency and accountability have been reached, does it make sense to consider pay for 
performance, bonuses, and other incentive structures.  
 
                                                          
12
 Examples of public administration systems that adhere to this school of thought are England, New 
Zealand, and Australia. 
13
 We recall that 100% of Interviewees expressed the opinion that civil service and politics should be 
separate, while at the same time they reported that currently civil service and politics are not sufficiently 
separate. 
14
 Examples are France and Germany. 
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 Prematurely implemented market-like structures are a retarding element for public 
administration reform and are to be avoided. They tend to reward the wrong people for the wrong 
reasons. More destructively, they tend to preserve and nurture old structures of patron-client 
thinking. This puts them on direct collision course with the goals of public administration reform. 
 The classical model of public administration presents itself as a suitable system, given the 
current needs.  Market-like incentive schemes may be introduced in the future, after a stable and 
professional civil service has been established.  
 
 
Furthermore, interview results point to the following subsidiary, and more specific, policy 
implications: 
 
 Personnel departments need to be strengthened. They must learn to aggressively compete for 
talent in the labor market.  At the same time personnel departments should provide professional 
career counseling in order to retain and nurture good employees. The idea of alternative career 
paths needs to be developed. 
 Performance evaluation and tracking systems, as well as general accountability systems need 
to be designed and implemented. This, first, requires an understanding of what appropriate 
criteria for good performance are.  There should be criteria for individual performance, as well as 
group performance. 
 After accountability systems and performance criteria are in place, motivation systems linking 
promotion and remuneration to performance should be designed. 
 Outsourcing to the private sector should be carefully considered. 
 Participation of the public in the policy-making process should be encouraged. In particular, it 
should become more common practice to conduct hearings before implementation of a policy. 
This allows for comments particularly by segments of the population that will be most affected by 
the policy.  
 
 
 
V CONCLUSION     
 
Public administration reform in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe has had successes as 
well as failures. On the whole, the target countries of this research are pursuing similar goals 
along similar trajectories. This seeming convergence originates from the necessary compliance 
with EU criteria that was required as a precondition to their 2004 entry into the European Union. 
By imposing a common set of qualification criteria, including criteria for public administration 
capacity, the European Commission focused the reform efforts of East European countries on a 
common set of goals and objectives. 
Of the three types of relations examined in this report, (public-private sector relations, civil 
service and politics, and employment relations) the relation between civil service and politics 
emerges as the most crucial and consequential. The other two relations are seriously affected by 
it. This is given recognition by the fact that 100% of respondents perceived this relation to be 
flawed, in that politicians wield too much direct influence over civil servants. The related high 
turnover rate in civil service retards the raising of the level of administrative capacity, as well as 
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the stabilization of civil service. As 95% of interviewees considered the establishment of a culture 
of civil service professionalism to be very important, and 91% considered administrative stability 
to be very important, de-politicization of civil service appears to hold a central position in the 
reform process, as it is a pre-condition for other reform processes to be effective.  
 
The sequencing of reform steps appears to be crucial. Market-like incentive schemes for civil 
servants are ill advised, before civil service has been sufficiently de-politicized, and before a 
credible accountability, and performance evaluation system is in place. So, reducing political 
influence on civil service will also benefit internal employment relations. 
 
Judging from the interview responses, and considering the features of some of the dominant 
public administration paradigms, a public administration system that preserves the major features 
of the “classical model of public administration” appears advisable.  
 
A competing paradigm, known as “New Public Management” (NPM), which has attracted 
attention through its emphasis on efficiency and “market-like” competitive structures, has also 
shown a tendency to re-introduce political control over civil service, which is exactly the opposite 
of what 100% of interviewees of this study considered desirable for their countries.  
 
There is much unfinished business in public administration reform. The task of simultaneously 
building markets, political institutions, and civil service structures has put enormous pressure on 
resources of all kinds.  
 
An encouraging sign is the high awareness among civil servants of the major problem areas. A 
particularly positive signal is the pragmatism that characterizes many reform efforts in Eastern 
Europe. In a rather eclectic way, many designers of public administration systems are focusing on 
“what works”, given the country‟s priorities and goals. They are refreshingly disinclined to attach 
themselves to particular ideologies. Unfortunately, sometimes they had to learn this “the hard 
way”, after detrimental results owing to misguided trust in western advisors, who arrived as 
salesmen of their own favored ideologies. 
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